Time for Washington to Take a Realis

Time for Washington to Take a Realistic Look at China Policy

By September 24，the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman signaled that Beijingwas "ready to study"American and British "proposals"that may be raised in theSecurity Council.26On October 25，President Jiang Zemin privately notified PresidentBush that China would not obstruct U.S.military action against Iraq，27and byNovember 8，China（like Syria）had voted for Resolution 1441in the Security Council.　　By January 2003，however，China saw that two other permanent members of theSecurity Council were ready to block a U.S.attempt to gain U.N.approval for militaryaction，and Beijing's diplomats discreetly lined up against Washington.　　On February 4，Powell met with his Chinese counterpart，Foreign MinisterTang Jiaxuan，in New York to brief Tang on Iraq.The next day，Tang privatelyreassured Powell that "as Chinese President Jiang Zemin had reassured U.S.PresidentGeorge W.Bush last October at the Bush ranch in Crawford ，Texas，China would`stand aside'on the Iraq issue at the U.N."Minister Tang also told French ForeignMinister Dominique de Villepin that China supported France's "strong and principledstance"calling for "more time"before approving the use of force against Iraq.Rather than "stand aside，"China instead lent rhetorical support to France andRussia，who both indicated that they would veto any use-of-force resolution.28　　In the end，the U.S.and its allies went ahead with the military invasion ofIraq without a new and explicit Security Council authorization，and China condemnedthe action in its public media as "nothing short of a war crime."29　　Although China has acquiesced in the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq，it remainscommitted to placing Iraq under U.N.authority and steadfastly opposes U.S.effortsto enlist U.N.assistance under U.S.leadership.In a speech to the U.N.GeneralAssembly on September 24，2003，Tang continued to snipe at the U.S.positionin Iraq.30　　As late as October 2003，China joined Russia，Germany，and France in pressingthe United States to commit to a timetable for withdrawing from Iraq at the earliestpossible time ，turn administration of Iraq over to the U.N.，and give the U.N.oversight of Iraq's financial reconstruction.China insists that the United Statesturn all sovereignty over to Iraq and make arrangements for a new constitution——uninfluenced by the United States ——at a later date.31　　Myth #3：China has helped in the North Korean nuclear crisis.　　As early as 1999，Richard Armitage （now Deputy Secretary of State ）wrotea report for the National Defense University in which he observed that China hadnot been particularly helpful to the U.S.in the North Korean nuclear crisis.Specifically：　　China has resisted active cooperation ——with the Korean Peninsula Energy De-velopmentOrganization，with the World Food Program，and on missiles.Its inde-pendent actionspose a challenge to any successful U.S.policy.32Armitage recognized that Chinahad its own distinct agenda separate from the American effort to coax North Korea（DPRK）to abandon its nuclear weapons efforts.　　By late 2003，it is painfully clear that Beijing is not on Washington's side，or even neutral ，in the North Korean debate.Initially，Washington apparentlycalculated that enlisting Beijing in the North Korean nuclear debate would causeBeijing to move Pyongyang in the direction the U.S.wanted.Instead ，Beijing hasexpended virtually all its energies on getting the United States to move in NorthKorea's direction.33　　North Korean "negotiators"continued their threats to "demonstrate or transfer"nuclear weapons at the failed U.S.-North Korean talks hosted by China in Beijingon April 23，2003，and repeated their demands for a formal U.S.-DPRK treatyguaranteeing the security of the Pyongyang regime ，extensive economic aid ，aresumption of construction of a nuclear power plant ，and formal diplomatic recognitionfrom Washington.In addition，the North Koreans demanded that the U.S.use itsinfluence with Japan to deliver on Japanese economic aid and diplomatic ties.Butthe North Korean representative did not respond to U.S.insistence that North Koreadismantle its nuclear weapons program "completely ，verifiably ，and irreversibly."　　A subsequent American effort to engage the North Koreans in a six-party multilateralsetting was also fruitless.To balance the sides，the Chinese recruited Russiato join a multilateral forum，which was finally held in Beijing on August 27，2003，with China and Russia supporting the DPRK and the U.S.backed by Japan andSouth Korea.In those talks ，the North Koreans continued their vituperate threatsand insults ，saving the most pointed jibes for the hapless Russian deputy foreignminister whom the North Korean delegate referred to by name as a "liar"and a "lapdog"of the Americans.34Moreover ，the North Koreans refused to budge from theirinsistence on the right to develop and maintain a nuclear arsenal.The session endedacrimoniously but was nonetheless painted as "a good beginning"by the State Department.　　U.S.Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly commented that at least "it waspossible for all who were there to hear what was said by any"——that no longerwould the world simply have to take Kelly's word that North Korea's envoys behavedabominably.One State Department official said privately that American's biggest"trump card is Kim Jong Il，"whose behavior，reflected in his diplomats ，isso irrational as to undermine hope that a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisisis even possible.　　Even Russia's normally sympathetic Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukovwas heard to have shaken his head in dismay and mutter "there go 55years of history."35The Russian remained noncommittal in public and would only "suggest"in private"that the North Koreans had not been listening to Mr.Kelly's presentation."36　　China ，however，remains firmly in North Korea's corner.The weekend afterthe talks ，Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that "the main problemwe are facing"is not North Korea'shistrionics ，but "the American policy towards[the]DPRK."This after the vice minister was described by all present at the six-partytalks as "visibly angered"by the North Korean delegates'outbursts.37　　Powell played down Wang's attack on the U.S.position ，saying that "neitherI nor my staff，nor have Chinese officials we have talked to in Beijing about thematter，seen a full transcript ……and I am quite sure the Vice Foreign Ministerwas not resting the problem on the United States."38Nonetheless，the view thatWang's attack reflected Chinese policy was given credence by another key State Departmentofficial who said ，"normally，hearsay evidence is inadmissible ，but there isan exception for the `excited utterance.'"39　　There were other signs of strain in China's relationship with the DPRK.In mid-September，Vice Minister Wang apparently confided to reporters that he would accompany Chairmanof the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo，the second ranking member in theChinese Communist Party hierarchy ，to Pyongyang in an attempt to nudge Kim JungIl on the talks.But intelligence sources in Washington say Kim postponed the visitfor several weeks and in the end conditioned the visit on additional Chinese shipmentsof oil.Indeed，Wu's visit finally took place at the end of October with promisesof additional aid ，and Wu returned to Beijing with assurances that North Koreawould return to the conference table，provided Japan abjures any mention of itskidnap victims.40共2页: 1 [2] 下一页 论文出处(作者):
Time for Washington to Take a Realistic Look at Chin
Time for Washington to Take a Realistic Look at Chin